

REMARKS

CLAIM REJECTION UNDER 35 U.S.C. 112

The Examiner has rejected claims 1 and 22 under 35 U.S.C. 112, second paragraph, as being indefinite for failing to particularly point out and distinctly claim the subject matter which Applicant regards as the invention with regard to the term "unformatted text." The Applicant disagrees with the Examiner.

Claims 1 and 22 include the limitation "receiving a text request comprising a unique identifier and unformatted text." The specification of the present application describes various scenarios for inputting the text request. The unformatted text can be anything that might be in the text request that is not a unique identifier. For example, page 13, lines 14-16, states "the identify operation 204 recognizes these unique identifiers when they are embedded in or surrounded by other keyboard characters." In this scenario, the unformatted text might be the "other keyboard characters." For example, page 11, lines 19-21, states "a patent document contains various numbers including dates, classification information, patent numbers, and possibly other numbers. Matching the selected criteria used to identify patent numbers from among the other numbers and text may depend upon, for example, removing all commas, or deleting (or ignoring) numbers with an intervening dash." In this scenario, the unformatted text might be "other numbers and text" or it might be the "commas" or "intervening dash."

Thus, the term "unformatted text" is clear from the specification, and the Applicant requests the Examiner to withdraw this rejection.

CLAIM REJECTION UNDER 35 U.S.C. 102

The Examiner rejected claims 1-43 and 45-47 under 35 U.S.C. 102(b) as being anticipated by Barr et al., US 5,873,076, (hereinafter "Barr"). The Applicant respectfully disagrees with the Examiner. Claim 1 expressly states "receiving a text request comprising a unique identifier and unformatted text, wherein the unique identifier identifies an electronic file." The Examiner points to several portions of the Barr reference showing bits and pieces of the above limitation; however, none of the portions cited by the Examiner meet all of the limitations recited in claim 1.

Specifically, in Barr, the search query itself does NOT include a unique identifier that identifies an electronic file as required by claim 1. Barr, in fact, discloses an information processing and retrieval system that receives a query and processes the query to identify documents and related information that the system has determined is associated with and/or related to the information and documents requested by the query. Barr states, "In the preferred embodiment, the search query is provided by the user in a natural language format. Thus, for example, if the user wants to locate relevant sources of information indicating how many soldier were killed in Vietnam, the user might enter the query, "How many soldiers were killed in Vietnam." (Col. 12, lines 19-24.) This query does NOT include a unique identifier that identifies any electronic file. The Barr system then scans its document index database to identify document identification numbers based on key words in the search query. (Col. 12, lines 48-53.) In other words, the document identification numbers, for example, unique identifiers, in Barr, are determined based on documents associated with specific terms in the search query but are NOT in the search query itself as required by claim 1.

Barr does NOT teach entering a unique identifier in the search query. The Examiner points to a variety of places to support her contention that it is included, including Figure 5, element 412 and its corresponding description in Col. 19, line 12, and other references. NONE of these references discuss anything about this information being in the search query. This information is contained in the index database as identified above, NOT the search query.

Furthermore, Barr does NOT teach the combination of a unique identifier and unformatted text in the search query. The Examiner states that in Barr the search query can include a unique identifier and gives examples of this. (As stated above, this is an erroneous conclusion.) The Examiner then states that the search query can include unformatted text as well and gives examples of this. NO where in the Barr reference does the Examiner point to where Barr teaches that the search query can include BOTH a unique identifier and unformatted text as required by claim 1. This difference is significant, because as discussed in the Summary of the Invention of the present application, errors are reduced. The user of the present invention is not required to accurately type in the unique identifier. The text request can include extraneous or unformatted text in addition to the unique identifier.

The present invention parses the text request to find the unique identifier. This is unique and advantageous because a user of the system can, for example, just cut and paste a bunch of information into the search box. The system will then parse the information to find the unique identifier, among other extraneous information or unformatted text, that refers to a specific electronic file and return that file to the user. Barr simply cannot do this.

Therefore, for at least the reasons discussed above, claim 1 is patentable over the prior art of record, and the Applicant requests that the Examiner withdraw the rejection. Likewise, independent

claims 9, 22, and 35 (continuing similar limitations), for at least the reasons discussed above, are patentable over the prior art as well. Claims 2-8, 10-21, 23-34, 36-47 depend from allowable independent claims 1, 9, 22, and 35 and thus are patentable as well.

CLAIM REJECTION UNDER 35 U.S.C. 103


The Examiner rejected claim 44 under 35 U.S.C. 103 as being unpatentable over Barr as discussed above in light of Himmel et al. (US 6,408,316). Claim 44 depends from allowable claim 35, as discussed above, and therefore, dependent claim 44 is also patentable over the prior art of record for at least the reasons set forth above.

CONCLUSION

For the reasons set forth above, claims 1-47, are patentable over the prior art of record. Applicant requests entry of the Amendment, withdrawal of the rejections, and passage of the case for allowance.

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